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THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN LIBEL LAW:
A PHILOSOPHIC ANALYSIS

I. INTRODUCTION
Jean Jacques Rousseau commented in The Social Contract, "In the
strict sense of the term, a true democracy has never existed and never
will exist."' That a human being, upon entering the "social contract"
should sacrifice some of his freedom so that others may enjoy theirs is
a principle of democratic government so true it is almost devoid of significance. Surfeit freedom inevitably reduces itself to the most pernicious
brand of chaos; and in chaos, no organized society can long exist. Edmund
Burke once stated, "But what is liberty without wisdom, and without
virtue? It is the greatest of all possible evils; for it is folly, vice and
madness, without tuition or restraint." ' Mark Twain, more humorously,
but just as succinctly, quipped, "It is by the goodness of God that in our
country we have those three unspeakable precious things: freedom of
speech, freedom of conscience and the prudence never to practice either. "'
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes exemplified the Burkian spirit of freedom,
but freedom supported by an inherent sense of restraint and wisdom when,
in his decision in Schenck v. United States,4 he stated that, "[tihe most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic." 5
One of the inherent philosophic and pragmatic problems in a democratic
form of government is reconciling the tension between order and freedom.
Such a problem does not exist in oligarchies or dictatorships; for in such
governments, order is synonymous with freedom. Thus, responsibility is
imposed from above. Yet, democracies entertain, by their very spiritual
foundation, an essential belief in the fundamental goodness of mankind.
Men will usually act responsibly, so the argument goes, if they are allowed
to be free. Thus, responsibility will arise from within the body politic if
people are allowed to be free to govern themselves. Few would argue
that these are not idealistic and noble philosophic sentiments. Human
experience reveals, however, that not all free people will act responsibly.
1. FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS, 358 (J. Bartlett ed. 1980).
2. L. COPELAND, POPULAR QUOTATIONS, 269 (1961).
3. B. EVANS, DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS, 252 (1978).

4. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
5. Id.at 52.
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Government is necessary in order for society to exist. Freedom must be
guarded by the restraints of law. A fundamental philosophic issue is,
therefore, how much "law" is just for the responsible exercise of freedom
and how much law is merely tyranny disguised as justice in the name of
order. Nowhere is this essential philosophic and pragmatic problem of
democratic government better illustrated than in the tension between the
first amendment and libel law. 6
Benjamin Franklin, the first great American printer, defended libel laws
when he said,
Few of us, I believe, have distinct ideas of its [freedom of press]
nature and extent ....

If it means the Liberty of affronting, cal-

umniating, and defaming one another, I, for my part, own myself
willing to part with my share of it when our Legislature shall please
so to alter the Law, and shall cheerfully consent to exchange my
Liberty of abusing others for the privilege of not being abus'd myself.7
Few of the early founding fathers entertained such sentiments, however,
and the freedom of press was included in the first amendment to the
Constitution. Yet, the common law tort of libel continued to exist. Clinton
Lawthorne, in his book Defamation and Public Officials,8 comments that:

Through the years, journalists in the United States have been plagued
with uncertainty as to what they could, or should, write about public
officials and candidates for public office. In considering what to write,
they have been forced, since the dawn of this nation, to balance their
ideas as to what the public should know against their ideas as to
what the libel laws would allow them to report. Such balancing has
not always been easy because of the difficulty in knowing what
constitutes libel, especially in commenting about public officials and
public figures. Though every state has its libel laws-either statutory
or common-these laws have been largely what the judges have said
they were. And the judges from state to state and from year to year
have greatly varied their rulings. In short, a patchwork of libel laws
grew up from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with some overall standardization but without national uniformity.
Differences prevailed until 1964, when the United States Supreme
Court in the case of New York Times v. Sullivan issued a broad

mandate that established a uniform standard for libel as it pertains
to public officials. 9
6. A.

HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS, 20, (1969).

7. Id. at 11.

8.

C. LAWrHORNE,

9. Id., p. XllI.

DEFAMATION AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS, XIII (1971).
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Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States'° is the latest
United States Supreme Court case concerning libel. Decided in the tradition of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan," Bose held that an appellate
court's review of the district court's "actual malice" determination is not
limited to the "clearly erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a).' 2 The Court reiterated its New York Times rule that in
all cases involving libel first amendment issues, appellate courts have a
duty to examine independently the portions of the record relating to the
actual malice determination to ensure that there are no constitutional
violations curbing freedom of expression. 3 Consequently, an appellate
court's standard of review must be faithful to both Federal Rule 52(a)
and the New York Times rule of independent review. Additionally, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in Bose that proof of a false statement does not establish that the defendant prepared the article with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of the truth. 4
This Article reviews the major Supreme Court decisions leading up to
Bose. It sets forth both the elements of libel and the standard of proof
which must be met in order to establish libel. It then analyzes how the
Supreme Court applied these standards to the Bose fact pattern and, in
addition, created a new procedural/appellate review standard. It also delineates the merits of Justice Rehnquist's dissent. The analysis concludes
by examining the implications of Bose upon New Mexico law and upon
libel first amendment liberties in general.
II.A BRIEF REVIEW OF NEW YORK TIMES AND ITS PROGENY
A. New York Times v. Sullivan: The Actual Malice Standard
New York Times v. Sullivan'5 arose during the height of the civil rights
protests in the South. Mr. L. B. Sullivan, a supervisor of theMontgomery,
Alabama police department, filed an action against the New York Times
for publication of an advertisement describing alleged maltreatment of
Black protesters. 6 The trial court awarded Sullivan $500,000.00 against
the New York Times and four other individuals named in the advertise10. 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) states that "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility
of the witnesses."
13. Bose, 104 S.Ct. at 1967 n.31. The first amendment states, in pertinent part, "Congress shall
make no law . . . abriding the freedom of speech or of the press. ... U.S. Const. amend. 1.
14. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1967.
15. 376 U.S. at 256.
16. Id. at 256-59.
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ment. 7 The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the decision based upon
the reasoning that the statements in the advertisement were libelous per
se and false. 8 Furthermore, the court determined that the evidence established malice on the part of the newspaper. The defendant's constitutional arguments were rejected on the basis that the first amendment
does not protect libelous publications."
The United States Supreme Court determined that the New York Times'
advertisement was not substantially correct and noted that the Times, at
the demand of the Governor of Alabama, had retracted the advertisement.2 ° Nevertheless, the Court stated that criticism of a public official's
conduct does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it was
effective criticism and hence diminished his official reputation.2"
After finding that an independent review of the whole record was
constitutionally mandated, the Court held that evidence showing that the
New York Times published the advertisement without checking its accuracy did not establish that the paper "knew" the advertisement was
false.22 At most, all the evidence established only that the New York
Times was negligent in its failure to discover the misstatements.23 Responding to first amendment policy considerations, the Court developed
a "federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not." 24 The plaintiff must establish actual malice with clear and convincing evidence.
B. Extension of the Actual Malice Standard to Public Figures
In Curtis PublishingCompany v. Butts,2 5 the Supreme Court extended
the New York Times actual malice standard to actions initiated by "public
figures" as well as public officials. Curtis involved a defamation suit
against the Curtis Publishing Company by Wally Butts, the athletic director of the University of Georgia. The Curtis Publishing Company
accused Butts of conspiring to "fix" a football game between the Uni17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 256.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 285, 287.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 279-80.
388 U.S. 130 (1937).
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versity of Georgia and the University of Alabama.26 The United States
Supreme Court held that anyone in the public eye who sought to prevail
upon a defamation claim must meet the actual malice standard set forth
in New York Times."
C. The Limits of the Actual Malice Standard
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 28 case is significant because it defined the
outer perimeters of New York Times. This case involved a Chicago policeman, Nuccio, who was convicted of murder. The victim's family
29
retained Elmer Gertz to represent them in civil litigation against Nuccio.
Robert Welch, Inc. published American Opinion, a monthly periodical
sympathetic to the views of the John Birch Society. In March of 1969,
Robert Welch, Inc. published an article alleging that Nuccio's murder
trial was part of a communist campaign against the police and that Gertz
was the architect of the "frame up" against Nuccio. 3 ° The article labeled
Gertz a "Leninist" and "Communist-fronter."' It also stated that Gertz
had been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, described as a communist organization that "probably did more than any other outfit to plan
the Communist attack on the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic
Convention." 3 2 Gertz sued for defamation.
The district court held that the New York Times' actual malice standard
applies to all public issues, regardless of whether the person defamed is
a public official or figure. Thus, although the trial court found that Gertz
was not a public figure, it applied the actual malice standard to Gertz."
The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
a publisher or broadcaster of alleged defamatory falsehoods may not raise
the New York Times' standard of actual malice against an individual who
is neither a public figure nor a public official. 34 Moreover, "[s]o long as
they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad35
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."
As a result of New York Times v. Sullivan, Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., a threshold question determines
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. at 155.
418 U.S. 323 (1974) (5-4 decision).
Id. at 325.
Id. at 325-26.
Id.
ld.
Id.at 323.
Id.at 339-48.
Id.at 347.
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the steps that must be taken in resolving defamation actions. The threshold
question is whether the plaintiff is or is not a public figure or official. If
he is not a public figure or official, he is deemed to be a private individual,
and it is left to the state to define its own standard of liability. For instance,
proof of mere negligence satisfies the defamation requirements against
private individuals in New Mexico. 36 If, however, the plaintiff is deemed
to be a public figure or official, the New York Times' actual malice standard
applies.
III. THE BOSE DECISION
Bose Corporation (Bose), a manufacturer of stereo speakers, filed a
defamation action against Consumers Union of United States, Inc., a
consumer product testing organization, for product disparagement arising
out of the organization's published review of Bose 901 speakers.37 The
review, while admitting that the Bose 901 speakers were "unique and
unconventional," concluded by saying,
[I]ndividual instruments heard through the Bose system seemed to
grow to gigantic proportions and tended to wander about the room.
For instance, a violin appeared to be 10 feet wide and a piano
stretched from wall to wall. With orchestral music, such effects
seemed inconsequential. But we think they might become annoying
when listening to soloists.3"
The Consumers Union's test actually revealed, however, that there was
sound movement back and forth along the wall in front of and between
the two speakers, as they were, indeed, designed to perform.3 9 The Con36. Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 402, 649 P.2d 462, 470 (1982).
37. The details of this case are rather involved. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. issues a magazine
called Consumer Reports. In its May 1970 issue, Consumers Union published a seven-page article
evaluating stereo speakers. Included in this evaluation were Bose speakers. The article, while stating
that the Bose speakers were "unique and unconventional," was overall very negative in its evaluation.
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 508 F.Supp. 1249, 1273 (D.C. Mass. 1981).
Bose Corporation took exception to numerous statements made in the article and when Consumers
Union refused to publish a retraction, Bose Corporation commenced their product disparagement
action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Bose Corporation attacked
the article on a number of points. First, they alleged the article was deliberately misleading in that
it referred to two persons as a "panel," thus creating the impression that the Consumers Union's
evaluations were objective rather than subjective. The district court agreed with Bose on this point,
but ruled that it did not entitle it to relief. Secondly, the district court rejected Bose Corporation's
contentions that the sound quality of the 901 speakers should have been rated higher because
evaluation of a speaker's sound quality is subjective and is "nothing more than an opinion and, as
such, it cannot be proved to be true or false." Finally, the court rejected Bose Corporation's arguments
that Arnold Seligson, the person primarily responsible for the article, based his article upon his
financial interest in marketing a competing speaker system upon which he had obtained a patent.
Nevertheless, the court agreed with Bose concerning the implications of the contested "about the
room" statement in the article.
38. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1953.
39. Id. at 1954.
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sumers Union's test produced no evidence to sustain the statement that
the instruments "wandered about the room." ' Bose Corporation contended that the "about the room" description was false, misleading, and
libelous since the sound heard during the Consumer Union's test actually
moved "along the wall" and did not "wander about the room." Because
sound movement is an important factor in evaluating the performance of
stereo speakers, Bose Corporation felt the "about the room" statement
41
deliberate product disparagement in reckless disregard of the
connotated

truth.

Arnold Seligson, an engineer employed by Consumers Union to review
the Bose 901 speakers, testified that his statement "about the room" was
intended to mean "along the wall." The district court held, however, that
the average reader would interpret "about" according to its plain, ordinary
meaning. 42 There was testimony indicating that Seligson was an intelligent
man and understood the English language and the inaccuracy of his
statement. In a bench trial, the district court judge determined that Bose
Corporation was a public figure, applied the actual malice standard, and
entered judgment in favor of Bose.43 Consumers Union appealed.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, after conducting an independent
review of the facts, reversed the district court ruling, stating that there
was not clear and convincing evidence that the Consumers Union article
44
was published with intentional or reckless disregard for the truth. Con45 Bose petitioned
sequently, Consumers Union could not be held liable.
for and received a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme
Court, arguing that the clearly erroneous standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a) prescribed the standard of review applicable in reviewing
a determination of actual malice."
The Supreme Court considered one issue: whether the court of appeals
erred in its refusal to apply the clearly erroneous standard of rule 52(a)
to the district court's finding of actual malice. Yet, in order to put the
issue into "focus," the court found it necessary to examine in detail (1)
the evidence underlying on the issue of actual malice; and (2) the reasoning
underlying the district court's determination." 7
Bose did not appeal the district court's ruling that Bose Corporation
was a "public figure" as that term is defined in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
40. Id. at
41. Id.at
42. Id.at
43. Id.at
44. Id.at
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.at

1954-55.
1952-53.
1957.
1954-58.
1955.
1967.
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Inc.4 8 The actual malice standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, therefore,

was applicable. The dissent, led by Justice Rehnquist, found the district
court's ruling that Bose was a "public figure" ironic:
It is ironic in the first place that a constitutional principle which
originated in New York Times v. Sullivan, 375 U.S. 254 (1964),

because of the need for freedom to criticize the conduct of public
officials is applied here to a magazine's false statements about a
commercial loudspeaker system.49

Demonstrating none of Rehnquist's misgivings, the majority essentially
applied the actual malice standard de novo. It focused on the allegedly
defamatory statement that instruments heard through the Bose system
tended to "wander about the room. "50 The district court concluded that
the statement that "[ilnstruments tended to wander 'about the room"'
was false. 5 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the record did not
contain clear and convincing evidence that the author or his employee
prepared the article or the statement with actual malice. 52
Arnold Seligson, an engineer employed by Consumers Union, prepared
the written report upon which the contested article was based. Seligson
testified that his statement "about the room" was intended to mean "along
the wall." Yet, the district court held that an average, reasonable reader
would interpret the word "about" according to its "plain ordinary meaning." The district court concluded:
Seligson knew that the words "individual instruments ...tended

to wander about the room" did not accurately describe the effects
that he and Lefkow had heard during the "special listening" test.
Consequently, the Court concludes, on the basis of proof which it
considers clear and convincing, that the Plaintiff had sustained its
burden of proving that the Defendant published a false statement of
material' fact with the knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of its truth or falsity. 3
Despite the district court's reasoning that Seligson was an "intelligent
person" whose knowledge of the English language could not be questioned, the Supreme Court concluded: "It]he District Court did not identify any independent evidence that Seligson realized the inaccuracy of
the statement, or entertained serious doubts about its truthfulness at the
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1954.
1967-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1965.
1956.
1967.
1957-58.
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time of publication. "54 The Court, therefore, affirmed the court of appeals'
reversal, holding that appellate review of the actual malice standard was
not limited to the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Indeed, in all first amendment libel cases on
appeal, Rule 52(a) must be augmented by an independent review.55 It
reasoned that those portions of the record which relate to the actual malice
determination must be assessed by each appellate court independently
because constitutional liberties protected by the actual malice standard
make it imperative that judges insure that this rule is correctly applied.
All other portions of the record must be assessed by the "clearly erroneous" standard.56
Justice Rehnquist in his dissent remarked:
It is ...ironic that, in the interest of protecting the First Amendment,
the Court rejects the "clearly erroneous" standard of review mandated by Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc. 52(a) in favor of a "de novo"
standard of review for the "constitutional facts" surrounding the
"actual malice" determination. But the facts dispositive of that determination-actual knowledge or subjective reckless disregard for
truth-involve no more than findings about the mens rea of the
author, findings which appellate courts are simply ill prepared to
make in any context..."
Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the court of appeals never rebutted the
district court's finding that Seligson had actual knowledge of his false
statement.58 Instead, the court of appeals merely concluded that Seligson's
language was imprecise and would not "support an inference of actual
malice. " 9 He viewed the New York Times' standard of independent review
as emerging from the need to review jury determinations of actual malice.
Juries are less likely to correctly apply constitutional law than trial judges.
Juries usually render general verdicts. Juries do not leave statements for
appellate courts to evaluate the jury's thoughts in applying the law. Yet,
in bench trials such as Bose, there are written records whereby the appellate court can determine whether the constitutional law was correctly
applied to the facts.' Consequently, Rehnquist concluded,
54. Id.
55. Id.at 1959.
56. Id.at 1960, 1967 n.31.
57. Id.at 1968 (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist does not define his use of "constitutional
fact." What he appears to be saying, however, is that questions of fact are pure questions of fact
whether they deal with first amendment liberties or not. There is, therefore, no such thing as a
"constitutional fact."
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.at 1969 n.2.
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Because it is not clear to me that the de novo findings of appellate
courts, with only bare records before them, are likely to be any more
reliable than the findings reached by trial judges, I cannot join the
majority's sanctioning of factual second guessing by appellate courts. 6'
The majority's holding in the Bose case is flawed. It is questionable
whether in sanctioning independent review of actual malice first amendment libel cases by appellate courts, the Supreme Court has further guaranteed and protected first amendment liberties as it is intended. Indeed,
the opposite might prove true. Independent review is a double-edged
sword. It is possible that courts of appeals will reject trial court factual
decisions that protect publishers from libel suits under the actual malice
standard. As Justice Rehnquist argued, trial judges are best suited to be
the finders of fact. A court of appeals should, in the interest of protecting
first amendment liberties, limit itself to the "clearly erroneous" standard
of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where the district
court litigation was a bench trial.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE BOSE DECISION FOR NEW MEXICO LAW
The Bose court made it clear that an independent review by appellate
courts concerning first amendment libel issues is a constitutional requirement.6 2 Consequently, New Mexico courts must follow the United States
Supreme Court's decision. Yet, New Mexico libel law has its own unique
characteristics and problems which will make application of Bose more
than a mere rote exercise. New Mexico Rule of Civil Procedure 52
illustrates this problem.
The New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure are modeled upon their
Federal counterparts. Ironically, one of the few exceptions to this format
is Rule 52. Unlike Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, which expressly
deals with "findings by the court," the New Mexico Rule of Civil Procedure 52 deals with non-jury trials. 63 An examination of the New Mexico
Rules of Civil Procedure establishes, moreover, that there is no other
statutory equivalent of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 located anywhere within the New Mexico rules. There is New Mexico case law,
however, which seemingly corresponds to the Federal Rule of Civil Pro61. Id. at 1970.
62. Id. at 1967.
63. N.M. R. Civ. P. 52(a) states:
(a) Waiver of trial by jury. Trial by jury may be waived by the several parties to
any issue of fact in the following manner:
first: by suffering default or by failing to appear at the trial.
second: by written consent, in person or by attorney, filed with the clerk.
third: by oral consent in open court, entered in the record.
fourth: by suffering waiver as provided in Rule 38.
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cedure 52. The case of Everett v. Gilliland,64 held that if the New Mexico
Supreme Court finds there is substantial evidence to support the findings
of a trial court, it is bound by those findings. If the findings are supported
by substantial evidence, they will be sustained on appeal. 65 New Mexico's
"substantial evidence" rule resembles the "clearly erroneous" standard
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
There are other examples. In Coronado Credit Union v. KOAT Television, Inc., 66 the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated that broadcasting
of defamatory materials by means of television generally constitutes libel67
and not slander, irrespective of whether it is read from a manuscript.
Arguably, therefore, New Mexico has been tempted to abolish the distinctions between libel and slander. Should this trend continue, the Bose
rationale of independent review of actual malice would be extended to
slander as well as libel cases in New Mexico where public figures or
officials were involved.
Additionally, the tort of libel per quod complicates this analysis. Libel
per quod includes one of the following: (1) "written words susceptible
of two reasonable interpretations, one of which is defamatory and another
which is innocent, or (2) publications which are not on their face defamatory, but which may become so when considered in connection with
innuendos and explanatory circumstances." 68 Where a communication is
open to both an innocent and a defamatory meaning, the finder of fact
must determine which meaning was understood by the recipients of the
communication. 69 Where, however, the defamatory character of a communication can only be shown by extrinsic facts, the New Mexico rule
prior to New York Times v. Sullivan was to "plead and prove either: (1)
that the publisher knew or should have known of the extrinsic facts which
were necessary to make the statement defamatory in its innuendo or (2)
special damages." 70 Whether or not the rule is still viable after New York
Times and its progeny is debatable and subject to much confusion."
64. 47 N.M. 269, 271, 141 P.2d 326, 328'(1943).
65. Entertainment Corp. of America v. Halberg, 69 N.M. 104, 105, 364 P.2d 358, 359 (1961).
66. 99 N.M. 233, 656 P.2d 896 (Ct. App. 1982).
67. Id. at 237, n. 1,656 P.2d at 900, n.l.
68. Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 98 N.M. 282, 288, 648 P.2d 321, 327 (Ct.
App. 1981).
69. Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (1982) (overruling Reed v. Melnick, 81
N.M. 608, 471 P.2d 178 (1970)).
70. Reed, 81 N.M. at 610, 471 P.2d at 180.
71. In Marchiondo, the court of appeals suggested in dicta that the "New Mexico variation on
the per se-per quod rule allowing pleading and proof of libel by extrinsic evidence without proof
of actual damages, has probably been overtaken by the rulings of the United States Supreme
Court .... 98 N.M. at 289, 648 P.2d at 328. The Marchiondo court, naturally, was referring to
New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny.

"
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Should the tort of libel per quod survive in its pre-New York Times form,
the question remains whether the Bose decision establishes independent
review of libel per quod suits.72
V. CONCLUSION
In an organized society, freedom cannot mean unbridled license, for a
society cannot long survive in chaos. Yet, neither can freedom be intolerantly restrained in the name of morality or good sense, for then a
democratic society smacks of tyranny. Somewhere between these two
extremes lies the compromise solution. It has been the duty of the courts
in this country to forge this compromise.
In the twenty years since New York Times v. Sullivan was decided, the
Supreme Court has not chosen a moderate compromise course, a course
between the extremes of surfeit freedom arid enforced restraint. The Court
has increased the freedom of the media while decreasing both public and
private individuals' ability to restrain them. By mandating appellate courts
to conduct an independent review of actual malice findings in bench trials
and by finding that the Bose facts were insufficient to support actual
malice, the Court reminded the lower courts that the media receives
maximum freedom at the expense of public officials and figures. In accordance with the increase in liberality of the New York Times line of
decisions, the trial court in Bose extended the "public figure" rationale
far beyond its original scope, to a stereo speaker manufacturer. This type
of extension could lead to equal protection violations. "Ordinary citizens"
must only prove negligence in order to seek redress from the tort of libel.
In contrast "public figures" must prove "actual malice"-a standard very
difficult to prove. The laws of this nation, therefore, do not equally protect
its citizens from the tort of libel. Ironically, the New York Times court
created the actual malice standard in reaction to a city government and
its officials who were abridging the rights of a certain class of peopleBlack Americans. Yet, in the process of rectifying this wrong, the court
has implicitly created an artifical class of citizens, who, like their counterparts during the civil rights era, are being denied equal protection
because of their alleged "special status." Arguably, therefore, the New
York Times/Bose line of decisions is specious "Jim Crow" sophism at its
best. "Separate but equal" has no place in American constitutionalism.
The people and press of this nation have a first amendment right to
express or hold any opinion they choose. There is, however, a great
72. Libel per se differs from libel per quod in that the communication alone must hold the
defamatory meaning without reference to any other facts not contained in the communication. As
we have seen, libel per quod can be shown by reference to extrinsic facts.
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difference between opinion and calumny. Opinion, where stated as opinion, is and should be protected to the utmost. False statements of fact,
recklessly written, which ruin the reputation of another, cannot and must
not be protected by the first amendment. As stated in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.:
Under the First Amendment, there is not such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges or juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error
materially advances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust and
wide open" debate on public issues."
A man's right to his own good reputation is more precious than any
benefit which might questionably be derived from surfeit freedom to
disguise the truth. It is time the Supreme Court rerecognized this fundamental maxim. As George Bernard Shaw said, "Liberty means responsibility. "74 If we are to secure our liberties from tyrants both obvious
and insidious, this principle must be respected. The Supreme Court has
spent twenty years ignoring responsibility in the name of freedom. Now
it is the time to protect responsibility.
The Bose decision, rather than protecting constitutional liberties, weakens them. The Supreme Court should reconsider the policies which have
typified its decisions since New York Times v. Sullivan and take a more
moderate path-a path which will protect freedoms through an awareness
and appreciation of the responsibilities freedom entails. In this way, the
moderate course will resume and our liberties will be secured for generations to come.
COSME JOSHUA HORNE

73. 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
74. Evans, supra, note 3, at 386.

